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Administration of a Negative Income Tax
William D. Popkint
A recent Comment in this journal1 described the negative income
tax (the NIT) as "the boldest and most seriously considered" proposal
for restructuring our welfare system. The Comment outlined the de-
fects of the current public assistance programs and proposed a model
statute to implement an NIT plan. Most of the debate over the NIT
has focused on theoretical economic and welfare goals. Yet many prob-
lems with the present welfare system can be attributed to difficulties
encountered in administering provisions that are theoretically im-
peccable. Neither the Journal Comment nor other articles on the NIT'
have analyzed these problems and their implications in much detail.
This article takes that focus. In a number of areas, the evaluation of
these administrative problems leads to different solutions from those
appearing in the Journal's Model NIT.
At present, the process of selecting those eligible for public assis-
tance and calculating their grants involves welfare workers in adminis-
trative activity which has tended to frustrate welfare objectives. The
discretion to determine eligibility and the concomitant responsibility
impose a tremendous burden on the welfare workers. When com-
bined with the poor's characteristic unfamiliarity with bureaucracies,
this discretion often leads to lack of uniformity in the treatment of
recipients, arbitrary decisions, and delays in the receipt of benefits.
Furthermore, before the amount of assistance is determined, it is
usually necessary to determine each beneficiary's needs and available
resources. Welfare workers must therefore spend much of their time
investigating each beneficiary rather than providing him with counsel-
ing services. Not only does investigating waste the welfare workers'
training, but it encourages the workers to invade the beneficiary's
privacy in order to inspect his belongings and ask questions about his
income, net worth, and consumption habits.
There is a great danger that an NIT will simply reintroduce these
administrative problems. However much it may resemble a tax, an
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. A.B. 1958, LL.B.
1961, Harvard University.
1. Comment, A Model Negative Income Tax Statute, 78 YALE L.J. 269, 270 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL NIT].
2. E.g., Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical? 77 YAu.
L.J. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowski].
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NIT is a welfare program and its clients will be former welfare bene-
ficiaries. It is essential, therefore, that a negative income tax be de-
signed to eliminate those aspects of public assistance which have led
to administrative inefficiency and abuse.
I. Gathering Information
A. Income
An NIT will scale benefits on the basis of need.: Thus all poor
families will receive the full basic NIT allowance unless they have
income. Their income will be subject to a special NIT tax rate, and
their benefits reduced accordingly. With a 50 per cent tax rate, for
example, each dollar of income will reduce benefits by 50 cents.
There are two general approaches to defining the resources which
will reduce NIT benefits. The NIT tax base might simply be the
regular income tax base; or a more comprehensive tax base might be
adopted, 4 which might include some portion of accumulated net
wealth. In the context of a welfare program for the poor a more com-
prehensive definition of income which would differ significantly from
the regular tax base could include public assistance," social insurance,6
3. See MODEL NIT 294, 302; Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowski 3.
To illustrate, a hypothetical provision might provide a family of four consisting of a
husband, wife, and two minor children with a minimum allowance of $2,000, subject to
a tax rate of 50 per cent on other income. Thus, all poor families of four will receive
$2,000 unless they have income. Each dollar of income will reduce benefits by 50 cents.
Of course, different minimum allowances would be provided to households of different
sizes and we will modify this example to illustrate complicating factors where appro-
priate. The break-even point in this .plan is income of $4.000 since, at this level of in-
come, the family stops receiving NIT benefits. Below $4,000. the 50 per cent tax rate
would not wipe out the entire $2,000 minimum allowance. The welfare, work incentive.
and budgetary implications of an NIT are not discussed in this article. They have been
dealt with in detail in the Comment proposing a Model NIT.
4. There has been considerable recent controversy concerning a comprehensive tax
base for the regular income tax. Bittker, A "Coinprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of
Income Tax Reform, 80 HAnv. L. Rxv. 925 (1967); Musgrave, In Defense of an Income
Concept, 81 HARv. L. Rxv. 44 (1967); Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A
Comment, 81 HARv. L. Rrv. 63; Galvin, More on Boris Bitther and the Comprehensive
Tax Base: The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, 81 HAnv. L Rxv.
1016 (1968); Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 H.%nv. L REV.
1032 (1968).
Dean Galvin now seems to prefer the term "broadened tax base" in deference to
Bittker's critique; see Galvin, Willis & Robbins, Technical Session on Tax Reform, 22
TAx LAw 30 (1968). The BTB has replaced the CTB. Orr & Orr, SitutAnrO. Or
RrvuE AND TAX STRucruRE IPLICATIONs OF BROADENING r11E FEDERLAL INCOME TAX
BASE (1968).
5. Rev. Rul. 57-102, 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 26 (public assistance payments not taxable).
This exclusion seems based on public policy, rather than an interpretation of the gift
exclusion of INT. REv CODE of 1954, § 102 [hereinafter cited as IRC]. in much the same
way that expenses are often not deductible for public policy reasons under IRC § 162.
Of course, their inclusion in the tax base would be a relevant issue only if they were
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gifts from friends, relatives and private charities, 7 payments discharg-
ing an obligation of support other than by a husband or former
husband,8 scholarships,9 and imputed income such as the rental value
of owner-occupied homes or the value of food consumed and grown on
the farm.10 In addition, deductions for interest" and taxes, 12 which
would seriously concern poor people who buy on credit, own homes
subject to property taxes, and live in jurisdictions with sales or income
taxes, might be eliminated. There are, of course, numerous other ex-
clusions and deductions allowed under the regular income tax which
might not be allowed under a more comprehensive tax base. These
include the exclusion of interest on state obligations,3 the percentage
depletion deduction, 14 the dividend exclusion, 1 and the capital gains
deduction 0 ; they are of lesser significance in the context of determin-
ing the resources of the poor.'7
For several reasons, there is considerable sentiment in favor of using
a comprehensive definition of income for NIT purposes, even if it is
not adopted for regular income tax purposes.' 8 First, the objectives of
a transfer payment program for the poor are obviously to help those
with low incomes. On the other hand, income tax exclusions and
deductions are often designed to provide economic incentives for those
with high incomes, notwithstanding the fact that they increase the
opportunities for personal consumption by the recipient of the tax
benefit. It is more difficult to disregard the effect on personal con-
sumption of an exclusion or deduction if the sole purpose of the
program is to help individuals with low personal consumption than
continued as supplemental benefits after an NIT were adopted. See C. GREEN, NEOATIVE
TAxEs AND THE POVERTY PROBLEM 86-92 (1967); Tobin, Pechman & MieszkowskM 14.16,
6. Rev. Rul. 55-652, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 21 (unemployment compensation not tax-
able); Treas. Reg. § 161-11(b) (1965) (Social Security not taxable).
7. IRO § 102(a).
8. Support payments pursuant to a legal obligation are not taxable, unless the Code
explicitly so provides as in IRC § 71 in the case of a husband or former husband. Cf.
Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
9. IRC § 117.
10. Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1934) suggests that
such income is not "income" within the sixteenth amendment, although that view
would probably not be adhered to today. If a corporation allowed an owner-shareholder
to use a house as a residence, rental value would be taxed to the occupant. Chandler
v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941).
11. IRC § 163.
12. IRC § 164.
13. IRC § 103.
14. IRC § 613.
15. IRC § 116(a).
16. IRC § 1202.
17. For a more complete discussion of a broadened tax base, see MODEL NIT 811-15.
18. C. GREEN, supra note 5, at 165-66; Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowskl 11.
390
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if the effect on personal consumption is only one of several considera-
tions. The transfer of $1,000 from a taxpayer with $10,000 of income
to individuals with $3,000 of tax-exempt income from interest might
seem inappropriate, whereas refusing to tax individuals on such in-
come for economic reasons, such as encouraging investments in mu-
nicipal bonds, might not seem as serious.
Second, there is often little urgency in providing low income tax-payers with economic incentives for certain consumption or invest-
ment behavior through tax subsidies. Individuals with low incomes do
not normally invest in tax-free bonds nor do they earn much ondividends or capital gains. The economic policies served by variations
from a more comprehensive tax base under the regular income tax
can, therefore, be served without subsidizing these activities when
engaged in by low income beneficiaries. Of course, the higher thebreak-even point 9 the more likely it is that the beneficiaries will be-
come significant with respect to the economic policies inherent in thegrant of exclusions and deductions under the regular income tax.
Third, explicit expenditures, such as the benefits paid under anNIT program, will not look the same to Congress as tax reductions,
such as a deduction for an expense or an exclusion of a payment. These
tax reductions do not enter into the budget.2 0 Thus, while tax reduc-
tions might be allowed to slip through unnoticed, expenditures willbe closely scrutinized by interests competing for the funds. Of course,
the poor who seek an NIT could point to the oil depletion deduction
as an example of the oil industry receiving money which might other-
wise be earmarked for an NIT program, and depletion deductions
might be clearly recognized as the equivalent of a government expen-
diture. But NIT payments will probably have to compete with suchgovernment expenditures as farm subsidies, without regard to the
existing tax benefits for the farm sector of the economy.2'
While the effectiveness of these arguments is problematical, it does
seem likely that there will be some expansion of the NIT tax basebeyond that used for the regular income tax. Under current welfare
19. See note 3 supra.20. There is considerable sentiment for treating exclusions and deductions under theincome tax as budget items if they are intended to operate as subsidies. Surrey. TheUnited States Income Tax System-The Need for a Full Accounting (Remarks Beforethe Money Marketeers, New York City, Nov. 15, 1967, Treasury Department Release).The Treasury has now published its idea of a tax expenditure budget. See Exhibit to1968 SEc. TaRAs. ANN. RE., reproduced at 7 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAx Rm. E 6-10.21. For a discussion of the farm benefits inherent under present law, see Hjorth,Cattle, Congress and the Code-The Dangers of Tax Incentives, 1968 lVms. L  Ry. 641.
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laws, "income and resources" of the household offset benefits.
22 Al-
though there is no uniform interpretation of this phrase, it certainly
embraces a more comprehensive definition of income and wealth than
the limited definition of income under the regular income tax.
23
The remainder of this section discusses the effect of administrative
considerations on expanding the tax base. We want to know which
items not included in taxable income under the regular income tax
but often put forward as eligible for inclusion in a more comprehen-
sive tax base might be excluded for administrative reasons. A major
thesis of this article is that physical and psychological invasions of
privacy are an unacceptable burden on welfare beneficiaries. There-
fore, no item should be included in the NIT tax base if it is likely to
perpetuate the invasions of privacy which are frequently involved in
current welfare investigations. Another important consideration is the
administrative expense incurred in determining the existence and
amount of any item which is to be included in the tax base. Adminis-
trative expense might not be as important under an NIT as under the
regular income tax, however, since the pressures for a more accurate
determination of income and wealth might outweigh administrative
difficulties in obtaining accuracy for the same reasons that a more com-
prehensive tax base might be considered appropriate.
1. Taxation of Benefits, Gifts, and Other Payments
Public assistance payments and social insurance benefits do not
seem to present any more administrative difficulty than wages
2
' and
should be taxed to NIT beneficiaries. These types of income are
normally paid in cash on a regular basis to a great many people by a
limited number of persons. The payors can easily report the amounts
paid to the NIT administrator. Computers can effectively check these
items by matching the reports of payor and payee. Of course, computer
time is not costless. But, except for this cost, there seem to be no other
obstacles to the inclusion of these items as income from an administra-
tive point of view.
Gifts from friends and relatives, on the other hand, present all the
22. Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1964) [hercinafter cited to as
Soc. Sec. Acti.
23. See Comment, Eligibility Determations in Public Assistance: Selected Problems
and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1307, 1321-24 (1967).
24. We are concerned only with administrative considerations. Commentators 
seem
to agree that payments based on need would not be taxed but payments in the nature
of insurance or retirement benefits would be taxed. See Comment to § 11, MODEL NIT
315-21; Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowski 17 (1967).
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administrative difficulties noted above and should be excluded from
the NIT tax base. If the donor is a friend or relative, he is unlikely to
be willing to report the gift to the administration because it would
decrease the benefits which the donee is receiving from the govern-
ment. Nor can the donee normally be expected to report gifts since
they are probably small, irregular, and not normally considered tax-
able income.
Moreover, it would be extremely difficult for an administrator to
detect unreported gifts without undue invasions of privacy. A common
audit technique to detect unreported income is to check a sample of
those taxpayers who are in the suspected category. If income reporting
by small businessmen or farmers presents compliance problems, small
businessmen and farmers can be identified and audited on a sample
basis. Individuals who receive gifts, however, are not members of a
particular class of people. Therefore, only by auditing numerous
randomly-selected individuals could the government hope to detect
recipients of gifts and to deter others from not reporting gifts. The
only effective way to determine if a particular person has received a
gift which neither he nor the donor reports is through an analysis of
the way in which he has disposed of his resources. If his expenditures
and increases in net worth are in excess of reported resources, then he
has failed to report some item. But the detection of expenditures and
increases in net worth to determine whether gifts have been received
can only be accomplished by determining how the family has spent
its money; and an effective program to identify these amounts can
only be accomplished by the physical and psychological invasions of
privacy that we wish to avoid.
A final consideration militating against including gifts in the NIT
tax base is the context in which disputes over the existence of gifts
usually arise. Welfare administrators tend to presume that past gifts
continue 2 5 or even that resources of a friend or relative are available as
gifts whether or not they actually are provided to the welfare recipient.
The difficulty of proving non-receipt which this presents to the welfare
recipient is often sufficient to dissuade him from pressing his claim.
Informal presumptions of this sort are a convenient device by which a
reluctant administration can limit the size of its relief rolls.
If gifts from relatives are excluded, how should payments which
25. See, e.g., INDIANA PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL, § IV-B-25. which creates a presump.
tion that payments continue if made by relatives obligated to support the beneficiary
until discontinuance is proven.
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discharge a relative's obligation of support be treated? The question
arises only when the relative is not a member of the beneficiary's
household; for if he were a member of the household, his entire in-
come might be taxed at NIT rates in accordance with the principles
discussed below.20 Unless a payment discharging an obligation of sup-
port is clearly identified by a court order or written agreement, it is as
difficult to detect as a gift and the likelihood of informal administra-
tive presumptions leading to improper denials of benefits is just as
great. Therefore, only the payments by a spouse, former spouse, or
parent which discharge an obligation of support should be taxed to
NIT beneficiaries and then only if pursuant to a court order or written
agreement.27
Including in the NIT tax base support payments of a spouse, ex-
spouse, or parent which are easily detected has the advantage of reduc-
ing the disparity between taxing the income of a man who is a member
of a household and taxing the support payments after a split of a
household which results in the man leaving the family. Since the
man's income is taxed at NIT rates if he is a member of the house-
hold,28 an exemption from the NIT tax base for support payments
from a spouse, ex-spouse or parent who has left the house would
provide an incentive to split the household.29 Gifts from private char-
ities will probably not present the difficulties of detection noted in
connection with gifts from friends and relatives and payments of sup-
port obligations not pursuant to a court order or written agreement.
These payments are often paid to beneficiaries as regularly as if they
were wages. Such systematic cash payments by private charities could,
therefore, easily be reported to the NIT administrators. But the
problems of keeping records where gifts were dispensed irregularly
would probably be considerable. And the difficulties of valuing gifts in
26. See p. 402 infra.
27. This is consistent with the regular income tax law which provides explicitly for
income splitting only if there is a court order or written agreement. IRC § 71. It goes
beyond the regular income tax law, however, in including payments for children in the
beneficiary's income. See IRC § 71(b); Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1061).
28. See pp. 403-05 infra.
29. The requirement, often found in welfare laws, that the beneficiary must pursue
judicial or other remedies against those obligated to support the family as a condition
to receiving benefits has been rejected. See, e.g., INDIANS PUBLIC AssISTANCE MANUAL,
§ IV-B-22 (reasonable effort to secure support payments is required). Since there is a
forfeiture of benefits only if the beneficiary is not reasonable in his efforts, this require-
ment would take time to determine compliance and would introduce another element
of administrative discretion which is subject to abuse. The thrust of an NIT is to
minimize such administrative discretion where possible. Nothing, of course, prevents
welfare workers from helping the beneficiary to obtain support payments; the forfeiture
of benefits is simply not to be used to force this result.
394
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kind, such as food and clothing, are probably too great to justify their
being reported to the NIT administrators.30 Therefore, gifts by private
charities should only be taxed to NIT beneficiaries if they are regu-
larly dispensed cash gifts.
Should scholarships be taxable? The tuition element of a scholar-
ship should probably not be taxed to NIT beneficiaries since this tax
benefit is intended to subsidize low income families; variance from the
regular tax laws by including tuition in the tax base would severely
hamper the goal which the exclusion of scholarships from income is
designed to accomplish. Several factors also militate against including
the living expense element of a scholarship in the NIT tax base. Liv-
ing expenses at school will probably exceed those which would have
been incurred at home. And only the amount of living expenses which
equal those which would have been incurred at home should be taxed
since only those amounts can be considered personal expenses of the
family which are reimbursed by the scholarship. Since isolation of
these amounts is too difficult a task, the entire scholarship should be
exempt.31
Most deductible items which are not included in taxable income
under the regular income tax, such as interest and taxes, would be ad-
ministratively easy to include in the NIT tax base, since they are
deductions from income which must be reported in order to obtain
the benefit of the deduction. There is, therefore, no need for an elec-
tive ten per cent standard deduction under an NIT to eliminate the
administrative burden of verifying claims of personal deductions by
small taxpayers.32
One group of deductions replaced by the standard deduction under
the regular income tax should not be excluded from the NIT tax base.
A tax base which purports to be comprehensive will not lightly dis-
allow a deduction for expenses to produce income. But under current
law most employee business expenses are replaced by the standard
30. Compensation of this kind is taxable under the regular income tax; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-2(d) (1965). However, certain exclusions from an employee's income are probably
explained by the administrative difficulty of detection and collection. See Rev. Rul. 59-58,
1959-1 Cuar. Buu.r 17 (Christmas turkey).
31. The problem of isolating the element of normal living expenses in traveling ex-
penses while away from home led to the deductibility of the entire expen-e of meals
and lodging. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921).
32. The merits of encouraging home ownership for the poor by allowing property
taxes and interest to be deducted is not discussed. Taxes might be provided for in deter-
mining the cost of living and, therefore, in setting the appropriate minimum allowance.
although variations among tax burdens on the poor in different states will make it
difficult to incorporate this element with any degree of accuracy.
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deduction if it is elected.33 Is this necessary in the case of NIT bene-
ficiaries? The best approach would probably be to allow the deduction
of such expenses rather than to allow an elective standard deduction
since it is unlikely that many NIT beneficiaries would have such
expenses to deduct as long as the tax break-even point were not too
high.34
2. Comparison with the Model NIT
The Journal's Model NIT includes in the tax base "gifts, (cash or
otherwise), support and alimony payments . . . in excess of a total of
550 per year,"35 except when received from a private charity. Payments
from private charity are probably exempted from taxation on the as-
sumption that they replace government payments to relieve need.30
The Model NIT would tax scholarships, including tuition, on the
theory that the burden can be avoided by not claiming the student as
a dependent This is a workable solution. NIT beneficiaries, however,
must still incur expenses for the student when he returns home. The
regular income tax strikes a balance favoring the family with a child
receiving a scholarship by excluding the scholarship in deciding
whether the father provides the student with over one-half of his sup-
port so that he may be claimed as a dependent.38 On balance, the policy
of an NIT should be to favor exclusion of the full amount of the
scholarship.
3. Taxation of Imputed Income and Net Worth
The rental value of owner-occupied homes is normally excluded
from the tax base under the regular income tax because of administra-
tive difficulties in determining rental value. It is certainly too difficult
33. IRC § 62(2).
34. It is difficult to know precisely how many NIT returns would have deductions
for employee business expenses. Income statistics for 1966 yield the following data of
uncertain import. About 33 million returns report less than $5,000 income. U.S. TREASURY
DEP'T, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS ON INCOME-1966, table I. Of these, about
450,000 deduct employee business expenses which are deductible whether or not the
standard deduction is elected. Id., table 24, col. 55; table 37, col. 55. Of the approxi-
mately 6 million returns under $5,000 which show itemized deductions about 3.5 million
show "other deductions," about 100,000 show child care, and about 100,000 show educa-
tion expenses. "Other deductions" include employee business expenses but the dollar
amount is only about $450,000. Id. 169 & table 25, col. 16. The figures on employee busi.
ness expenses incurred by those electing the standard deduction are likely to be of a
lesser magnitude. These figures suggest, but do not prove, that the administrative burden
would be manageable.
35. MODEL NIT 311 (§ 11(b)(4)).
36. See p. 392 & note 24.
37. MODEL NIT 311, 318 (§ 11(b)(10) & comment).
38. IRC § 152(d).
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to estimate the actual rental value of each home. An alternative would
be to estimate a net return on the value of the home which would ap-
proximate the inclusion of rental value in income. This approach has
the advantage of adjusting for the expenses to produce rental income,
such as depreciation, interest, taxes, and repairs, which would have to
be deducted from rental value to arrive at a net imputed income from
the house.39 Under this estimation approach the value of the house
must be determined, and, unfortunately, local property assessments
are usually too inaccurate to be used.40 Perhaps original cost could
serve as an approximation of property value; this figure is likely to be
easily available since bank financing is commonly involved.
It is unlikely, however, that estimates of rental values would be
meaningful for most of the families in an area unless administrators
were to identify each community very precisely and make separate
presumptive estimates for each community. The estimate would have
to be a minimum value, not an average, to prevent overestimating tile
income of many individuals, unless each separate community for which
an estimate was made was homogeneous. Using a minimum value
might well make determining the imputed rental value hardly worth
the effort, since such a small amount of income would be included in
the NIT tax base.
Further difficulties arise when the impact of such administrative
procedures upon poor people is considered. Since the poor often cannot
obtain adequate credit through conventional banking institutions,
many poor home owmers "buy" their homes on installment land con-
tracts, bond-for-deed arrangements, or purchase money mortgages. 41
In many of these situations, the buyer may not have legal title to his
home or even an equity of redemption until he has paid a substantial
portion of the purchase price. To uncover these sales, which are often
not publicly registered until title passes, the NIT administrators would
have to cross-examine the recipient or initiate investigations into the
recipients' financial affairs-practices which the NIT should not en-
courage. Furthermore, poor home buyers pay premium rates for the
credit they do obtain; often the credit charge is incorporated into the
39. A presumptive technique to tax rental value of owner.occupied homes was in
effect in the United Kingdom until the Finance Act of 1963. See World Tax Series.
United Kingdom § 9/4.1 and CCH BRITisH TAX GUIDE § 1-201A.
40. MfAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 137-41 (1965).
41. See CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, SELLING AND BUYING REAL ESTATE
IN A RACIALLY CHANGING NEIGHBORHOOD 8-9 (1962); ILLtNOIs LEcISLATtVE COatvsStoN ON
Low INcomE HousiNG, FOR BETrrE HOUSING IN ILINoIS 32-33 (1967); G. STERN ,IEI. THE
TENEMmr LANDLORD 114-16 (1966).
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sale price, resulting in prices 50 per cent above or even double the
fair market value of the house. 42 Imputing income on the basis of
original cost would not accurately approximate the home's rental
value and would be unfair to the NIT recipient. On balance, the
difficulties in imputing rental income seem to outweigh any advan-
tages. But since not many people own their own homes, the admini-
strative burden of determining the rental value of their homes may not
be as great as suggested.
The value of food grown and consumed on farms could be deter-
mined without examining the consumption behavior of individual
farmers. Unlike gifts, however, it would be easy to determine the
category of beneficiaries to be examined. Perhaps a satisfactory solu-
tion is to check a few farmers in each community in order to estimate
the value of such food, without embarking on a widespread audit of
the consumption patterns of all farmers. This estimated value of food
grown and consumed on the farm would then be included in the NIT
tax base, unless the farmer could refute the determination and prove
the actual worth of the home grown food he consumed.
What kinds of wealth and how much of such wealth should be con-
sidered available as income under an NIT? One form of wealth could
be included in the NIT tax base without any administrative difficulty.
The return of capital in the receipt of periodic payments (which also
include interest amounts) pursuant to Social Security or private an-
nuity retirement plans is as easy to include in the tax base as wage
payments. And excluding only that element of the payment which
represents the return of capital might prove administratively difficult
unless separate computations of this amount had already been made
by the payor.
The administrative problems raised in considering other forms of
wealth as partially available for consumption stem from the necessity
of discovering the net wealth of the beneficiary. Some items of wealth
could be determined without great difficulty, such as houses, cars, bank
accounts, and stocks. Bank accounts and stock ownership could be
reported to the NIT administrators by holders of such assets at the
same time they report interest and dividends paid thereon. 43 The
ownership of houses and cars is normally recorded in a public place,
such as the County Recorder's Office or the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.
42. See cHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, supra note 41, at 5.6; G. STEaN-
LIEB, supra note 41, at 116, 145.
43. IRC §§ 6042, 6049.
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Other possessions, however, can only be detected by having the bene-
ficiary assess himself or by examining his consumption patterns or
home in a way which is likely to involve invasions of privacy. Wealth
statements filed by individuals are not a familiar part of our tax
system and are not very effective except for property which is easy to
detect anyway.44 Washing machines, coats, and television sets can
only be detected by going into the home of a taxpayer.
One of the implications of these considerations is that, in order not
to discriminate between such obvious forms of wealth as houses and
less obvious forms of wealth such as consumer durables used in the
house, net wealth should not be considered as available for consump-
tion. But to prevent the rich man who failed to receive income in a
particular year from receiving NIT benefits when he has available
wealth which he can easily convert to cash, such as stocks, or on which
he can easily borrow without any burden, such as a luxury house, some
portion of net wealth over a generous exemption level should probably
be included in the NIT tax base.45
4. Comparison with the Model NIT
The Model NIT includes in the tax base an imputed five per cent
return on all gross capital, including both personal and income-produc-
ing property.46 The beneficiary is permitted to base his calculation on
net capital alone if he will also include the interest paid on related in-
debtedness. Therefore, a taxpayer will prefer to include five per cent
of gross capital in his income as long as interest rates exceed five per
cent. The question is whether a five per cent imputed return is rea-
sonable. As a realistic description of imputed income on personal
property, it is surely too low if interest rates are higher than five per
cent. No landlord would settle for a five per cent return on his gross
investment if he had to pay more than five per cent for his capital. A
more rational rate of return would be the Federal Reserve discount
rate plus some specified percentage that properly accounts for both the
rate of interest paid by landlords on mortgages in excess of the Fed-
eral Reserve discount rate and a normal rate of profit. The rate of re-
44. As of 1961, 83 per cent of locally assessed property taxes in the United States
were imposed on realty. MAXWU.L, FiNANcING STATE AND LoCAL GovnNutL'. 134-37
(1965).
45. Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowski 18, suggest that the exemption level be eight
times the minimum allowance. Houses owned by poor people would probably be exempt
under this rule.
46. MODEL NIT 321-22 (§ 12).
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turn would not include a return of depreciation and maintenance ex-
penses since in the case of personal property they are not deductible
and have already been taxed. It might be argued that home owners are
the primary group who will include imputed income in their NIT tax
base and that a high imputed rate of return might force them to sell
their homes to make ends meet. But, a realistic rate of return should
represent the savings in rent that they enjoy, and a low estimate would
discriminate in favor of a home owner in comparison with their neigh-
bors who rent.
Since a minimum five per cent return is imputed to income-produc-
ing property as well as personal property, the Model NIT may have
been reluctant to use a high imputed rate of return on property from
which the taxpayer is not deriving income in the form of personal en-
joyment. The technique of imputing income to unprofitable busi-
nesses, however, is only useful as an economic incentive to invest in
more productive property. An NIT should avoid imposing penalties
on beneficiaries with low income to encourage them to produce more.
An NIT should seek to encourage productivity by limiting the tax
rate on income to 50 per cent, not by imposing a burden on a taxpayer
who does not realize income because he does not work or is inefficient.
If the imputed rate of return is fixed without reference to the tax-
payer with unproductive income-producing property, a major reason
for keeping the rate low will be eliminated.
The Comment to the Model NIT also suggests that the five per cent
return will prevent taxpayers with hobbies from receiving benefits. It
is certainly appropriate to prevent taxpayers who engage in hobbies
from receiving NIT benefits since a hobby is a highly productive con-
sumption-producing activity, not an unproductive income-producing
venture. The gross capital used in hobbies should be taxed, however,
at the high rate applied to other personal property, not a low five
per cent rate, and the expenses connected with the hobby should be
treated as personal expenses. It will rarely, if ever, be necessary to
utilize this approach under an NIT since taxpayers with hobbies will
probably have other income pushing them above the tax break-even
point. The suggested approach to hobbies, however, is more rational
than either a five per cent imputed return on all gross capital as under
the Model NIT or no imputed return at all and a deduction for the
personal expenses attributable to the consumption-producing property
to the extent of gross receipts, as under the regular income tax.
The gross capital on which the five per cent estimate is applied by
the Model NIT is fair market value. Local property assessments are ap-
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parently expected to be useful, although it is recognized that estimates
may be made.47 The Model NIT would tax the value of home grown
food on the basis of estimates.48
The Model NIT includes imputed income from less obvious forms
of wealth in the NIT tax base only if they exceed a certain mini-
mum-for example, $4,000 in the case of a family of four for clothing
and consumer durables (apparently including cars, even though the
administrative difficulty in determining ownership is minimal). In-
cluding an imputed return on property such as clothing and durables
is likely to inspire administrative actions which will offend NIT bene-
ficiaries, such as frequent investigations of their homes.
For a family of four the Model NIT exempts the $16,000 of net
wealth from the tax base.49 Since only net wealth is taxed this is prob-
ably high enough to exclude the homes of poor people. Consumer
durables in the home and clothing are apparently included, however,
in determining whether the exemption is exceeded. Since including
such items is more likely to offer the NIT administrators an excuse
to enter the home of NIT beneficiaries, it seems best to tax only
wealth items whose ownership is publicly recorded, such as homes and
cars, or items held by institutions which can be required to report
ownership of assets held by them, such as banks and insurance com-
panies.
5. Summary
Someone familiar with the administration of the regular income tax
may have been wondering what all the fuss is about. After all, he
might ask, the enforcement of income tax laws with respect to low
income taxpayers is quite simple. Why should there be any difficulty
under the negative income tax? We do not really know, however, how
well our income tax laws are enforced at low income levels. Since most
of the tax is collected by withholding from wages,r ° it has never seemed
wise to devote extensive resources to an examination of these tax-
payers' incomes in view of the small return per taxpayer which this
effort would bring. Only a very small percentage, usually under four
per cent,51 of low income taxpayers are audited each year. And we do
47. MODEL NIT 328 (comment to § 15).
48. MODEL NIT 523 (comment to § 12).
49. MODEL NIT 824 (§ 15(b)(4)).
50. For 1967, 50.5 of 69.4 billion dollars in individual income taxes was collected
through withholding. 1967 COm m'R INT. Rxv. ANN,. REP. 14.
51. 2.77 out of 72.2 million individual and fiduciary returns were audited; this is
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not know how much income goes unreported. The wages of domestic
workers or persons with temporary odd jobs are often not reported by
the payors because of the administrative headaches involved in filling
out the forms and because such wages in the case of payments to do-
mestic help may not be deducted. The percentage of unreported wages
would probably be much greater with NIT beneficiaries than with
regular income taxpayers. Furthermore, since the 50 per cent tax rate
under an NIT would be much higher than under current law, the
employee would have a much greater incentive not to report wages
than under the regular income tax law.52
Since the NIT tax base will probably be more comprehensive than
the regular income tax base, it is clear that our experience with low
income taxpayers under the regular income tax is of doubtful help in
predicting the administrative problems of an NIT. Occasionally an
area involving complex administration of low income taxpayers does
receive attention, such as the taxation of tips. 3 But problem areas in-
volving low income taxpayers generally receive inadequate attention
from the Internal Revenue Service not only because of their expense
in relation to the return per taxpayer, but also because the IRS does
not wish to dissipate its public image by "going after" low income
taxpayers.
It is probably true, therefore, that a well-administered NIT will be
more complex and more expensive per individual than the administra-
tion of the regular income tax. Of course, this revelation comes as no
surprise to welfare administrators who have long struggled to deter-
mine "income and resources" of the beneficiaries. Still, these com-
plexities should never lead to the kinds of invasions of privacy which
have plagued current welfare administration. It is not enough to shift
to a declaration system which separates auditors from welfare workers.
The job given to auditors must not be so designed that it can only be
satisfactorily accomplished by reviving the investigative techniques
3.8 per cent. Since a much larger percentage of returns reporting at least $5,000 of income
are audited than returns with income under $5,000, the figure for low-income taxpayers Is
certainly lower. 1967 COMMR' INT. Ray. ANN. Rm'. 16, 23-24.
52. If the employee's tax rate is as high as 50 per cent, the employee might make a
deal with the employer to reduce his normal wages so that both employer and employee
are better off than if normal wages had been reported. If the employer is in the 30 per
cent bracket and is paying $10 wages to an employee in the 50 per cent bracket, the
employee might receive only $6 unreported income and both employer and employee
are better off than if the income is reported, a deduction taken by the employer and a
tax paid by the employee.
53. See cases cited at 3 CCH 1968 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 2767.1028.
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which have created so much dissatisfaction. "Income and resources"
must be defined with this problem in mind.
B. Determination of the Household Unit
1. Definition of Needs and Identifying Household Members
Under an NIT, the desire for precision in allocating benefits will
probably lead to an attempt to determine benefits on the basis of the
needs and resources of the entire household, assuming that there is an
honest record of income and potential members of a household.54 How
can the needs of households of different sizes be defined, and how can
the members of a household whose resources are to be considered in
determining benefits be identified?
A quest for precision in the definition of need usually leads to the
suggestion that the schedule of benefits for families of different sizes
provide for a minimum allowance for each additional member of the
family which is less than the allowance for a single-member household.
For example, if a single-member household would receive an $800
minimum allowance, the presence of a wife or child would result in
additional benefits of less than $800 per person. This suggestion re-
flects the received tradition, which is not without its critics, that in-
cremental needs decline as the number in the household increases.5
The desire for a precise identification of resources leads to the
proposal that the income of all members of the household be ag-
gregated to determine whether resources are available to meet needs.
Thus, it would be unfair if all the members of one family were de-
nied benefits because each member earned an equal share of an annual
income of S4,500, while another family received benefits because the
wife and children earned nothing, even though the man alone earned
$4,500.
54. One problem, of course, is to assure that the members of a household reported
on a return really exist. They might simply be fabrications intended to inflate the needs
of the family. However serious a problem, false claims of this nature cannot be guarded
against by substantive modifications of the NIT. They are a familiar part of our regular
income tax administration and present no special problems in the context of an NIT.
Thus, the main concern in this section is with the accurate definition of needs and
resources.
55. Measuring incremental costs of married living is far from a precise endeavor. It
seems that two together can live more cheaply than two apart, which is the rationale for
declining increments to the minimum allowance. However, if the comparison is between
living as part of one's parents' family with life together as man and wife, this conclusion
is not so dear. Furthermore, allowing any incremental costs for a wife might be ques-
tioned if the comparison is between a bachelor who will be more likely to purchase
food at restaurants and pay for cleaning and laundry services and a married couple
where the wife's services reduces these costs. See Oldman & Temple, Comparathke Analysis
of the Taxation of Married Persons, 12 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1960) for a discussion of the
different approaches to taxing married couples.
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The problem of defining a household to take account of economies
of scale and pooling of resources is the most difficult problem in de-
signing an NIT. A definition which focuses on the economic rela-
tionships among individuals would probably meet NIT objectives
best. A household for NIT purposes should consist of persons who
share resources under circumstances which evidence an implied com-
mitment to share their resources for the future needs of the group.
Focus on the economic unit is justified because an NIT is a welfare
program and should, therefore, treat groups with equal resources
equally to the extent that this is administratively possible.
A requirement that there be a relationship of mutual support ex-
cludes from the definition of a household any group which combines
only to achieve economies of scale. For example, two roommates or two
families who share a house and, perhaps, the expenses of food, should
not be considered a household any more than lawyers who share rent
and secretarial costs are partners. There is no implied commitment
of resources of one individual or family to the future needs of the
other individual or family, only a reduction of costs for the members
of the group. It is true that individuals realizing economies of scale
need less than others. But there are many opportunities for different
households to reduce costs of living, and it would be unwise to reopen
in every case the question of the level of need of a prospective bene-
ficiary. One of the major advantages of an NIT is the fixing of an
objective allowance schedule without regard to the opportunities for
economizing which a welfare administrator might discern or consider
appropriate in particular cases. The definition of a household as the
economic unit involves enough administrative difficulty without ex-
panding it to include measuring the economies of scale resulting from
all joint efforts.
Some certainty can be introduced into the definition of an economic
unit by treating the unmarried child as part of the household in
which he resides in all cases. There are often legal and social limits
on the use of a child's income for the household. These limits are
not likely to prevail, however, among low income families, and the
aggregation of the child's income with income of other members of
the household is therefore justified.50
56. The logic of aggregating a child's income with the income of other memtbers of
the household is questioned in Bittker, Income Tax Reform in Canada: The Report of
the Royal Commission on Taxation, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 637, 645-50 (1968). Under the
regular income tax this pattern regarding differential needs and aggregation of resources
is not followed. A husband and wife are taxed as though their income were received
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Several other possibilities have been rejected in deciding to define
the household as an economic unit for NIT purposes. The definition
of a head of household under the regular income tax,57 while closely
related to the concept of an economic unit, is deficient in a welfare
context. The rules have been developed under the regular income tax
to relieve the taxpayer who provides financial help to others by re-
ducing his tax rate rather than imposing a tax on the recipients of
such help. For example, a man would qualify for head of household
status if he lived in a home and provided more than one-half the cost
of maintaining the household for a member of the household who is
his unmarried lineal descendant or step-child.r8 But the costs of main-
taining a household, as defined by the Code, include only expendi-
tures for housing and food and do not include the costs of other
necessities.59 The man will qualify as head of a household in the above
example, therefore, even if he does not provide more than one-half of
the entire support of the member.°0 If the member of the household
is not an unmarried lineal descendant or step-child, however, the
man would have to provide more than one-half the support.0 1 This
statutory pattern seems designed to approximate the economic unit
since it focuses on financial support. The omission of the requirement
that the man provide more than one-half of the entire support in the
case of unmarried lineal descendants and step-children is probably
based on a presumption that the support is provided in those situa-
tions in any event. Such a presumption, however, is not justified in a
welfare context where the effect would be to take the children off the
NIT rolls, not reduce taxes. Payment of more than half the rent and
half the food bills is good evidence that a relationship of support has
equally by two separate one-member households, IRC § 2(a); the tax burden is not
greater if the two taxpayers are husband and wife, rather than two single persons. Thus
a husband and wife do not end up with less money after taxes than two single-member
households whose aggregate income equals the total income of the husband and wife.
And the deduction for personal exemptions for each child is the same as the deduction
for the adult members of the family. IRC §§ 151(b), 151(e)(l). A critical apprasal of
equal deductions per additional child appears in an excerpt from a 1947 Treasury De-
partment study, reported in S. SuRREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL INcossE TAx 407-15 (1960).
Moreover, the income of the child and the father are not aggregated to determine tax
obligations. For example, a family with $3,500 earned by the father only pa)s a $74 tax.
whereas if the father earned $2,900 and the son was under 19 and earned $600, there
would be no tax. Not only is the income not aggregated, but the child receives a deduc-
tion for his own personal exemption and the father also receives a deduction for the
child if he provides over one-half of his support. IRC §§ 151(b), 151(e)(1)(B)(i).
57. IRC § 1(b).
58. IRc § l(b)(2)(A)(i).
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.1-2(d) (1956).
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.1-2(b)(3)(1) (1956).
61. IRC § l(b)(2)(A)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.1-2(b)(3)('i) (1956).
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developed, but it should not be conclusive. Finally, the regular income
tax denies a man head of household status if the household he seeks to
establish includes a woman who is not his wife, relative, or in-law.02
A completely different approach to defining a household is to focus
on the legal status of marriage as the criterion. This approach should
be rejected because marriage might be discouraged if it were to estab-
lish conclusively that a household exists. Furthermore, since the
existence of a marriage does not preclude recognition of a split house-
hold under the regular income tax law, it should not prevent proof
of a split household under an NIT. Separation is a recognized basis
for splitting the taxable unit, and the need for a separation agreement
as proof of separation under the regular income tax law is a bit of ex-
pensive sophistication not justified in a welfare program for the poor.
Nor should the fact that the couple is not married conclusively de-
termine that they do not form a household. The demise of the legal
institution of common law marriages does not mean that the reality
has disappeared. 3
Welfare administrators long sought to resolve the definition of a
household by resorting to a presumption that a man who cohabited
with a woman was part of her household without regard to the length
of his presence in the household, his legal obligation of support, his
appearance to the community as a member of the same social unit as
the woman and children, or his financial participation as a member
of the same economic unit as the woman and children. The Supreme
Court has now ruled that cohabitation is an insufficient criterion for
household membership under the Social Security Law.0' It is still an
open question under the Social Security Law, however, whether a
legal obligation of support, membership in the same social unit, mem-
bership in the same economic unit, or some combination of these
will make a man a member of the household. Federal regulations
presently require as a condition for including children in the house-
hold that there be a legal obligation of support which is generally
applicable to all children and not just to children on welfare. The
regulations further limit potential membership in the household to
fathers and step-fathers ceremonially married to the woman.0 5 A three-
judge district court in California has held these regulations invalid
62. IRC § I(b)(4)(B)(i) (1956).
63. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 2.4 (1968).
64. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
65. Soc. Sec. Reg. § 203.1(a)(b) (Aug. 8, 1968).
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and upheld a California law which includes a man in the household
without regard to his legal status as a father or a step-father if he "is
in or around the home" and he either represents himself to the com-
munity as a husband or father or assumes financial responsibility for
the family.68 The California law makes such a man legally responsible
to support the family only if the children are on welfare.
California seems to include a man in the household if he has both
a legal obligation of support and he either forms a social unit with
the woman and children because of his representation to the com-
munity or forms an economic unit with them by assuming responsi-
bility for their financial well-being. The precise rationale of the fed-
eral regulations, on the other hand, is unclear. The requirement that
the obligation to support the children be general and not limited to
children on welfare might be designed to insure that the man is really
considered by the community to be a member of the social unit.
Limitation of membership in the household to fathers and step-fathers
ceremonially married to the woman seems designed not to identify a
man in the household but to eliminate some of the administrative
abuses associated with identifying the role played by the man-in-the-
house.
As suggested, an NIT should not focus either on the social unit or
the existence of a legal obligation of support, but on the economic
unit.67 If the man is not a member of the economic unit, the re-
mainder of the family does not share in his resources. Conversely, if
he assumes financial responsibility for the family, his resources are
available and he should be a member of the NIT unit to determine
both needs and resources.
Similarly, a legal obligation to support the women and children
should not be a condition for inclusion in the household under an
NIT. If membership in the household were conditioned upon the
existence of a legal obligation, the automatic exclusion of the man
from the household in all other cases would discourage the develop-
ment of more permanent relationships, since a legal obligation of
support generally exists only in the case of fathers and step-fathers
ceremonially married to the woman. A state might, of course, extend
66. Lewis v. Stark, Poverty Law Rptr. 9299 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1968).
67. Membership of the man in the social unit including the woman and children
might be a valid criterion for membership in the household under the Social Security
Law which seeks to omit families from welfare who have a man-in-the.house if his
social role is analogous to a father. King v. Smith, 392 US. 309, 329-30 (1963). An NIT,
however, seeks to benefit economic units.
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the obligation of support to other men. Limiting membership in the
household to cases where a legal obligation of support exists, however,
is an irrational narrowing definition of households. Households
should be determined on the basis of actual economic relationships,
not on the happenstance of state-imposed legal obligations of support.
NIT administrators will face a difficult task in deciding whether a
man is actually part of an economic unit. The problem is not merely
in applying a difficult standard to ambiguous fact situations, but in
dealing with beneficiaries who might be reluctant to cooperate. If an
NIT provided for declining incremental benefits per additional mem-
ber of the family and for aggregating the incomes of members of the
economic unit, it would often be more advantageous for a family to
appear to be split. For example, if the minimum allowance of a one-
member household is $800 and added members increase the allowance
by $400 per person, the family of four without income is entitled to a
$2,000 minimum allowance; but a household of one and a household
of three are eligible for $800 and $1,600. Furthermore, if the man
earns $2,500 of income, he could avoid the 50 per cent tax rate on
much of his income by posing as a single-member household. If the
break-even point for a one-member household is $1,600, assuming an
$800 minimum allowance and a 50 per cent tax rate, income over
$1,600 would not be taxed at 50 per cent.08 Agregation of the man's
income with the income of the woman and children, however, results
in the man's income being taxed at 50 per cent up to the break-even
point for a four-member household, which is well over $1,600. Thus
the family obtains greater NIT benefits by appearing to be split.
The sensitivity of the investigation required to identify an economic
unit can be appreciated by considering the questions which must be
answered. To what extent must a person's privacy be invaded to de-
termine whether absence of a man from a home is temporary, 0 or
whether payments by the man are large enough or regular enough, or
sufficiently used for household purposes, so that they can be charac-
terized as support by a member of the economic unit, not gifts or
compensation? An NIT will have to be administered with consider-
able care in this area.70 Investigations to determine who are members
68. The father would have an option to be taxed at 50 per cent up to the tax
breakeven point. The concept of a "tax break-even point" is discusscd at pp. 413.14
infra.
69. The greatest invasions of privacy have involved detection of the man in the house.
Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
70. One method for solving these household determination problems is to eliminate
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of a household bear an uneasy resemblance to those needed to de-
termine who received gifts from whom if the analysis of the source
and amount of funds received by a mother and children is pursued
with any vigor.71
The acceptability of investigations to determine household member-
ship will depend on the tact and understanding which investigators
bring to their work. If they approach it with suspicion rather than as
an attempt to resolve an admittedly difficult fact situation, the ad-
ministration of an NIT will not be a significant improvement over
current welfare administration.
2. Comparison with the Model NIT
The Model NIT takes a somewhat different approach to the man-
in-the-house-problem.72 Its basic thrust is automatically to exclude a
man from a family unit unless he is married to the woman or has
fathered her child. Thus a husband is considered part of a wife's
household unless there is a legal separation or divorce or an informal
separation. If the man had never been married to the woman, he is
excluded-assuming they have no children-even if they live together.
If the man is the father of the woman's child, domicile with the woman
will result in the man's inclusion in the family unit; but if the man's
paternity is not established, he is excluded despite domicile with the
woman.
the relevance of a split household for NIT purposes. Some progress touards this goal canbe obtained by providing equal increments to the minimum allowance per additional
member of the family. See also p. 423 infra. Doubts about the real differences inbudgetary needs of added members of the household support this approach. See note 55
supra. If it is thought too generous to provide the same allowance per child as perparent, a lesser amount can be provided for each child. Care must be taken, however,
that a two-member household does not claim that it consists of two adults, if it only
consists of one adult and one child.
Manipulation of allowances per member of the household, however, will not eliminatethe motive to split the household when the man earns income since the adjustment ofthe minimum allowance schedule does not remove incentives to avoid the 50 per centNIT tax rate on income. Reducing the tax rate to eliminate this incentive would raisethe cost of the program by creating a higher break-even point, if the minimum allow-
ances were maintained; and if the break-even point were maintained and the tax rate
were reduced, then the minimum allowances would have to be reduced which might
cause them to be inadequate.
Perhaps the incentive to claim a split household would be reduced if there were some
service which would be supplied to families that included a man in the household and
which would not be provided if the man were not part of the household. Thus, publichousing or federal loans for housing could be made unavailable for apartments or homes
over a certain size if the family did not include a man. Of course, this would not elimi-
nate the importance of accurately identifying households; it would only help eliminate
the incentive to falsify information.
71. See p. 393 supra.
72. MoDEL NIT 507-09 (§ 9).
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These provisions apparently try to eliminate the administrative
burden and potential for abuse inherent in investigations concerning
a man-in-the-house unless there is objective evidence which establishes
some likelihood of a household. The spirit of this proposal is in accord
with the objectives indicated above. The question is whether the
proposal will be effective in accomplishing these goals.
In the case of a man and woman without children, the approach of
the Model NIT will eliminate inquiries about the man-in-the-houlse
unless the man is the husband, a fact which can normally be established
with some objectivity. The existence of common law marriages, how-
ever, might present difficulty. The Model NIT might, therefore, be
more rigorous in the pursuit of its objectives if marriage were only
considered when it was evidenced by a document.
Of course, if the man is the husband, delicate inquiries about the
man-in-the-house are not eliminated-if there is informal separation
the husband is excluded from the household. Since the Model NIT
requires different residences for a finding of informal separation, the
investigation is similar to the search for a household and could still be
a source of abuse. Furthermore, this provision might discourage
marriage, a danger acknowledged in the Comment, since the man is
included in the household only if he is the husband. There is, of course,
a similar danger even if the "household" unit could include a man who
was not the husband, since the NIT administrators might find it diffi-
cult in practice to avoid a presumption that the man should be included
within the household only if he is the husband.
If the woman has a child the Model NIT includes the man in the
household only if he is the father and if he is domiciled with the
woman. Of course, "domicile" is as difficult to determine as "house-
hold." The question is whether limiting this inquiry to cases of
paternity significantly restricts the inquiry to cases which can be ob-
jectively identified. The name of the father of a child born out of
wedlock is not likely to be recorded publicly. Investigations to deter-
mine paternity are likely to be as sensitive as inquiries about a house-
hold.
On balance, the advantage of limiting inquiry about the man-in-the-
house to cases where he is the husband of the woman or the father of
the child seems insignificant. In spite of its difficulties, the concept of
the household most accurately expresses the general principle, and
specific legislation, short of allowing the man to be excluded in all
cases, is not going to eliminate the investigation of sensitive situations.
A household approach also requires determining whether several
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adult members of a family who live together, such as a mother-in-law
and her child, are members of a household, whereas the Model NIT
does not impose such a requirement. Arrangements involving relatives,
however, are not as transitory or as sensitive as arrangements between
a man and a woman.
If the household approach suggested in this article is taken, a prob-
lem arises when the man is part of the woman's household but does not
treat the children as part of the economic unit. The Model NIT has
dealt with this situation by providing that children are to be treated as
a separate household for NIT purposes if the man in the woman's
household owes no duty of support to the children and does not in fact
support them. Under the Model NIT, this could only occur in the case
of a stepfather since a man not married to the woman cannot be part
of her household unless he has fathered her children, in which case he
owes a duty of support to the children. The treatment of children as
a separate household should be developed further. Whenever the man
fails to support the children, even if he is part of an economic unit
including the woman, children should receive NIT benefits based on
the allowance provided for dependents. However, the treatment of the
children as a separate household should not depend, as it does in the
Model NIT, upon whether the man has a legal obligation for the
children. Therefore, whenever the father, stepfather, or other man
who is part of the woman's household fails to provide support, the
children should be eligible for NIT benefits. If this approach were
adopted and the man were part of the woman's household but not the
children's, his income should be taxed at 50 per cent up to the break-
even point for two adults. The woman's income should be included
as part of the resources of the children's household, however, since
it is presumably used for their benefit.
II. Distribution of Benefits
After developing a definition of income and a minimum allowance
schedule, a system for distributing benefits to the beneficiaries must be
established. There are several major problems. First, how should
declarations of resources and withholding be used to obtain accuracy
in the distribution of net benefits? Second, if NIT benefits are ex-
cessive, should refunds of overpayments be demanded from bene-
ficiaries? Third, what automatic penalties should be imposed if bene-
ficiaries file declarations which underestimate their NIT tax bases?
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Fourth, what assistance should be given to beneficiaries in filling out
their declarations and in computing benefits?
A. Declarations and Withholding
There are three types of declarations which should be filed by an
NIT beneficiary to be eligible to receive benefits. First, the beneficiary
should have to declare his name, his address and the members of his
household, together with their social security numbers. This is a
"declaration of status." Every potential recipient need not file such
a declaration. If it is expected that income will exceed the break-even
point, an individual who did not expect to end up as a net beneficiary
from NIT payments would probably not want to receive benefits. He
would thereby avoid the difficulties of having to make income esti-
mates, of being subject to withholding, and of dealing with the NIT
administration. Second, the beneficiary must file an income estimate,
either initially or periodically during the year, in order to insure that
the benefits which he receives bear some relation to his needs, unless
withholding from income can accomplish this result. Third, a final
declaration must be filed annually to determine whether or not the
benefits received during that year have been inadequate or excessive.
In order to determine the rules that should apply to the filing of
these declarations, let us begin with a simple example of a family of
four in which the father earns $2,600 in wages during the year in
equal weekly installments of $50. We will also assume that the period
for determining eligibility is the entire calendar year. Thus low income
in one month will not be the basis for higher benefits than would be
dictated by annual income.
7 3
If the beneficiary is employed prior to the beginning of the calendar
year, it would seem appropriate for him to file his declaration of
status with his employer in much the same manner as he now files a
WA form with his employer to tell the employer the number of ex-
emptions to which he is entitled. The employer would then handle the
paper work by forwarding the declaration to the government, which
would place the employee's family on NIT beneficiary rolls. Since the
50 per cent withholding rate for NIT beneficiaries is well above normal
73. For example, no income during the first half of the year and $2,600 during the
last half would result in the same $1,300 tax and $700 benefits as if the $2,600 were
earned in equal weekly installments. The beneficiary would not be entitled to $1,000
which is one-half of the yearly minimum allowance, because he had no income during
half the year. Determination of benefits on the basis of monthly, not annual, Income
is discussed at pp. 421-22 infra.
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withholding rates,7 4 the agency administering an NIT would have
to make sure that employees have correctly informed employers that
they are receiving NIT benefits. Benefits should probably be paid
monthly to assist the family with budgeting; less frequent payments
simply increase the risk that large lump sum payments will be
squandered, leaving the family with no resources, and more frequent
payments might be too much of an administrative burden. If the
beneficiary were unemployed prior to the beginning of the year, he
would have to file his declaration of status directly with the agency
administering the NIT.
It does not seem wise to require employees to estimate wage income.
The sole purpose of filing declarations of estimated income is to enable
an accurate distribution of benefits during the year. Thus, an estimate
of S2,600 income would reduce net benefits to $700 from $2,000; i.e.,
by 50 per cent of $2,600. The difficulties of estimating income, how-
ever, are considerable and beneficiaries should not have to rely upon
estimates if it is not necessary. Subject to certain limitations discussed
below, the wages received by an NIT beneficiary can be subject to
withholding so that the net NIT benefits received by wage earners
are correct. In our hypothetical case, the father can receive the full
minimum allowance of $2,000 in equal monthly installments and
still not receive excess benefits if 50 per cent of his wages are withheld
each week.75
There are two methods for applying the withholding rate. First,
wages would continue to be subject to withholding at the 50 per cent
rate until the tax break-even point is reached.70 This approach to
74. IRC § 3402(a).
75. Fifty-two times $25, which is the one-half of the $50 weekly salary, would be
withheld. This equals $1,00, which is one-half of the income received during the year.
An alternative procedure whereby the employer receives the net benefit from the govern-
ment and pays it to the employee with his wages is discussed at p. 419 infra.
76. The tax break-even point is somewhat higher than the break-even point. In the
hypothetical plan, the break-even point is $4,000. Consider a family of four with $4,200
in wages. Its taxable income is probably $1,200 assuming no business or personal deduc-
tions and no excludible income under the regular income tax laws. The tax thereon
would be $174 which is considerably more than 50 per cent of the $200 in excess of the
break-even point. IRC § 3(b), table IIl. Thus, it would be more advantageous for the
taxpayer to continue to be taxed at 50 per cent of the excess over $4,000 rather than to
be taxed as though he were a regular income taxpayer. The rate of withholding would,
therefore, continue to be 50 per cent until the regular income tax equaled 50 per cent
of the excess over the break-even point. The point at which this equality is reached is
referred to as the tax break-even point; for our family of four, it would be $4,408. The
50 per cent tax rate would, of course, be too high if personal or business deductions
reduced gross income below $4,200. Therefore, the application of the 50 per cent rate to
income between the break-even point and the tax break-even point could be optional. It
is probably too complex, however, to introduce this option into the withholding tables
in administering an NIT, although a regular taxpayer can reduce withholding if he
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withholding keeps the taxpayer current on his NIT tax obligation
even if he quits work, since the NIT beneficiary's wages are taxed un-
til they reach the break-even point. A similar technique is used under
the Social Security Law; the specified percentage continues to be
withheld until wages reach $7,800 and this withholding stops.'7
Second, each month's wages could be considered as one-twelfth of
the annual wages and be subject to withholding accordingly. This
method of withholding is followed under the regular income tax. If,
instead, withholding under the regular income tax were kept current
so that nothing was withheld until an obligation was due, there would
be wide fluctuations in withholding. If the head of a family of four
earned $300 per month, there would be no withholding until No-
vember when his $3,000 of deductions for personal exemptions and
his minimum standard deduction were used up. In November and
December, 14 per cent of his salary would suddenly be withheld and
he would take home less per month than he had been accustomed to.
To avoid this problem, each month would be treated as a microcosm
of the entire year; one-twelfth of the $3,000 deductions is allocated
each month, and $50 per month is subject to the 14 per cent with-
holding rate.78
Which of these two withholding methods, the Social Security or the
regular income tax model, should be used under an NIT? It would
certainly be much simpler for the employer to use the federal income
tax model. Under this model the employer does not have to keep
track of total wages paid for the year; instead the employer can
determine the amount of withholding required for the relevant pay
period by consulting withholding tables. Although it is true that the
employer must keep track of total wages paid each employee for Social
Security, the amount of tax to be withheld does not vary with the
size of the family. Since tax break-even points do vary with family
size under an NIT, computations in addition to those required for
Social Security would be necessary if withholding for an NIT used the
Social Security model.
But if the federal income tax model were used under an NIT, it is
likely that some underwithholding might occur. If an NIT bene-
anticipates that his taxable income will be less than gross income under certain cir-
cumstances. IRC § 3402(m).
77. IRC §§ 3102(a), 3121(a)(1).
78. Compare the withholding from annual pay periods, IRC § 2302(a)(2), table 7(b).
with withholding from monthly pay periods, lRC § 3402(a)(2), table 4(b). IRC § 3402
(b)(1) incorporates exemptions into the withholding tables for each pay period.
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ficiary earns wages at a monthly rate which, if maintained for the
whole year, would exceed the amount of income subject to the NIT
tax rate, then some portion of the monthly income would suffer with-
holding at less than the NIT tax rate, since the withholding method
assumes that income in a later pay period will be subjected to the NIT
rates. If the employee stops work before the year is over," however,
underwithholding will occur because the NIT tax rates are regressive.
Eliminating the possibility that underwithholding may occur under
an NIT may not be advantageous since the remedy may create an
incentive not to work. For if the tax is withheld at a 50 per cent rate
until the tax break-even point is reached, more might be withheld
during a pay period than is transferred to the beneficiary.80 The head
of a poor family will most likely hold down a full or part-time job
for a while and then be temporarily out of work, or another member
of his family might supplement family income in this pattern.8, If an
NIT beneficiary is head of a family of four, the basic grant he is en-
titled to might be $2,000;82 if he were offered part-time work or a
temporary job paying $433.33 per month, his monthly minimum al-
lowance would be one-twelfth of $2,000 or $166.67, but the amount of
withholding at 50 per cent rates would be $216.67. Less withholding
would occur if the federal income tax model were used, although, at
79. For example, if the employee works for six months and earns $2,.600, only $1,000
would be withheld under the NIT if each month were treated as a microcosm of the
entire year. It would be assumed that $2,000 of another $2,600 earned in the last six
months of the year would be subjected to 50 per cent withholding. If the employee
stops work at the half year, there would be $300 undenvithholding for the year.
Under the regular income tax the result of stopping work is overithholding. This
results because tax rates are progressive and a portion of income for each pay period is
treated as though it were subject to the graduated rates appropriate if te rate of earn-
ing income persisted. However, stopping work reduces annual income so that the ap-
plicable tax rates are below the graduated withholding rates. The simplest example is
the single taxpayer earning $900 in one month and then not working after that. He
gets the benefit of only one-twelfth of his $900 deduction for a personal exemption and
minimum standard deduction and suffers withholding not merely at the 14 per cent
bottom rate, but at graduated rates. See tables in IRC § 3402(a).
A different procedure is followed in the United Kingdom where pay periods are
cumulated and lower withholding rates and even refunds are made if later pay periods
indicate that there was excess withholding during earlier periods; see Murray. With-
holding and Pay as You Earn: A Contrast in British and American Methods of Tax
Collection, 1962 Bmrmt TAx Rxv. 173, 176.
80. In this example the NIT benefidary has declared himself eligible for NIT
benefits because he does not expect to maintain this income level for the year. The
amount withheld during the prosperous months would not result in excessive with-
holding if the entire year's income is considered; it will simply look like a large amount
to withhold to the employee.
81. C. GR.m,, supra note 5, at 4, cites Social Security data which indicate that in
1963, 22 per cent of poor families had a head of the family who worked at a full time job
less than 50 weeks during the year and 14 per cent who worked at part-time jobs.
82. See note 3 supra.
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this monthly income, more would be withheld than the beneficiary
would receive in benefits; only one-twelfth of the tax break-even point
($4,408) would have suffered withholding at the 50 per cent rate, which
amounts to $183.67. The regular withholding rate of 14 per cent, not
50 per cent, would apply to the excess of monthly income over $367.33.
Total withholding per month would be $192.91, which is more than
the $166.67 in benefits but less than 50 per cent of earnings. 83
This concern with disincentives to work will not be shared by those
who place a great deal of faith in provisions, similar to the recent
amendments to the Social Security law, which provide for a reduction
in benefits if a beneficiary refuses work without good cause. This ap-
proach to encouraging work, however, is at variance with the theme
of the NIT. The imposition of penalties for not working requires ad-
ministrative decisions as to whether the unemployment was justified.
Instead, an NIT seeks to encourage beneficiaries to work by providing
automatic incentives in the form of reduced tax rates on earnings (as
compared with the 100 per cent tax rate imposed by welfare laws). '"
The other withholding problem under an NIT is overwithholding.
If the father earns $2,600 from one employer and either he or his wife
earns $2,600 from another, $2,600 would be withheld if both declare
themselves NIT beneficiaries and suffer withholding at a 50 per cent
rate. The overwithholding problem may be exaggerated. First, it is
more serious if there is a low break-even point such as $2,500 since
overwithholding is more burdensome at lower income levels. Second,
it does not arise if total family income is not greater than the tax break-
even point. Third, the problem can be avoided by anticipating that
83. 14 per cent of $66, which is the excess of $433.33 over $367.33, is $9.24. This
amount, when added to $183.67, equals $192.91.
84. The new Social Security Law also provides carrots by disregarding the first $80
of earnings per month and one-third of amounts over $30 in determining the resources
of an employed member of the family; there is an added proviso, however, that the zero
per cent tax rate on the first $30 and the 66-2/3 per cent tax rate on income over $30
is available only if the beneficiary does not, without good cause, quit work or reduce
earnings. Soc. Sec. Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)(19), 630-44 (1964), as amended P.L, 90,248,
§§ 204(b) & 204(a), 81 Stat. 890-92 & 884-90 (1967), provides for the creation of programs
to integrate beneficiaries into the work force. Soc. Sec. Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F)
(1964), as amended P.L. 90-248, § 204(b), 81 Stat. 891 (1967), mandates that the unjustified
failure to participate in these programs will result in the refusal to consider that in-
dividual's needs in calculating benefits for the family. See Comment, Compulsory Work
for Welfare Recipients under the Social Security Amendments of 1967, 4 COLUbt. J. OF
LAW & SoC. PROB. 197 (1968). Soc. Sec. Act, 42 U.S.C. § 607(b) (1964), as amended P.L.
90-248, § 203(a), 81 Stat. 882-83 (1967), requires that a program to assist families with
unemployed fathers, if adopted by a state, include only families whose father has worked
and did not leave work without good cause. Soc. Sec. Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ll)
(1964), as amended P.L. 90-248, § 202(b), 81 Stat. 881 (1967), provides for reduced rates
on a beneficiary's earnings under certain circumstances.
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income will exceed the tax break-even point before the year begins
and not declaring for NIT benefits. Fourth, it can be minimized by
opting out of the NIT program when excessive withholding is antici-
pated during the year.
Furthermore, withholding according to the federal income tax
model will not remedy the overwithholding problem. $2,600 will still
be withheld if the two wage earners each earn $2,600 in twelve
equal monthly installments. The reduced withholding rate under the
federal income tax model8 5 helps to prevent overwithholding only
if the wage rate for a pay period is such that wages would exceed
the tax break-even point if continued all year. A more appropriate
method to avoid overwithholding in this case would be to permit only
one employer to withhold at 50 per cent rates. If the wife is not the
prime earner in the family, perhaps her income should be subject only
to regular withholding rates rather than the 50 per cent rate. In most
cases, the family's judgment as to who is the prime earner should be
accepted. But if the children are treated as a separate NIT household
when the man supports only the woman, s0 the woman should be
treated as the prime earner of the children's household for withholding
purposes. If the prime earner has two or more employers, however, it
might be difficult for NIT administrators to identify a prime source
of employment, and if the head of the household has discretion to
identify the prime source, he may abuse it. Therefore, all employers
of a prime earner should withhold at 50 per cent rates.
All things considered, it does seem best to withhold from prime
earners in a household by using the federal income tax withholding
methods under an NIT. The danger that work disincentives and
inconvenience to employers will be created by the Social Security with-
holding method outweighs the withholding problems that the federal
income tax withholding method entails. And although beneficiaries
may not receive the correct amount of benefits because each month's
wages are considered one-twelfth of the year's wages under the federal
income tax withholding method, having each beneficiary estimate his
annual income would probably lead to an even more inaccurate dis-
tribution of benefits because of the problems the poor face in ac-
curately forecasting annual income.
It has been assumed thus far that the declaration of status has been
filed prior to the beginning of the year. What happens if it is filed
85. See pp. 415-16 supra.
86. See pp. 409-12 supra.
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during the year? If on July 1, the head of the household learns that he
will stop receiving salary or the beneficiary wakes up to his rights under
the law, each should be allowed to file a declaration of status to receive
benefits for the remainder of the year. The declaration would indicate
the wages received by the family prior to the date of filing. The NIT
administration would then subtract one-half of the wages received
from the total benefits to which the family would be entitled and add
back any withholding taxes on such wages. To enable the NIT ad-
ministration to obtain this information, employers would have to give
employees wage and withholding information upon request.
While withholding of the entire NIT tax by the employer and pay-
ment of NIT benefits by the government might be the best way to
obtain accurate payments of net benefits to beneficiaries, an alterna-
tive approach is to have the employer pay the correct net amount to
the employee. Under this system the employer would inform the NIT
administration of the wage rate paid to the employee who has filed
a declaration of status. The NIT administrators would then pay the
employer the amount of net benefits to which the employer is entitled.
Thus, if the employee earned $100 per month, the monthly minimum
benefit of $166.67 would be reduced by 50 per cent of the salary and
sent to the employer, who would pay the employee his salary plus his
NIT benefit-216.67 in all. This method of paying the employee may
make him feel less like he is on welfare and, by omitting from his pay
check an explicit 50 per cent withholding item, encourage work.
This payment procedure, however, creates several difficulties which
make it questionable. If the employee's wages increase or decline, the
employer must inform the NIT administration and a new computa-
tion of net benefits must be made. If the employee loses his job, the
administration must be notified and the method and amount of pay-
ment adjusted. If a second member of the family begins work and
his or her earnings are considered household resources in determining
the payment of net benefits, this information must be reported to the
administration in order to adjust the net benefits paid monthly. This
approach for distributing NIT benefits, as compared with the with-
holding method, is more burdensome on employers, who must be in
more frequent contact with the NIT administrators, and on the NIT
administration which must recompute net benefits with every change
of wage or employment status. Under this approach beneficiaries might
also be subject to the additional burden of keeping the NIT ad-
ministration informed about the earnings of other members of the
family, if such earnings are relevant. The major defect of this pro-
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cedure, however, is that it substitutes periodic reporting and computa-
tions for an annual reporting and automatic withholding system 81
This procedure would work well only if the poor held steady jobs with
steady incomes.
Matters become more complicated when non-wage-earners are con-
sidered. If public assistance, private charity and social insurance are
included in the tax base, the best approach would be to treat the dis-
burser of such benefits like an employer and require withholding.
Should the 50 per cent rate be applied to such payments until the
break-even point is reached or should it be applied as though each
payment period were a microcosm of the entire year? Because work
disincentives will not be created, whatever amount is withheld, and
because the payors, at least in the case of Social Security, utilize com-
puters to disburse benefits, the objections to the Social Security
method of withholding which were persuasive in the case of wages do
not control here. Therefore, the 50 per cent tax rate would be applied
to the payments until $4,000 (the break-even point) were disbursed.
And because public assistance and private charity are not likely to be
offered if they would, together with other income, provide the family
with more income than $4,000, there is little reason to worry about the
problem of overwithholding. Social Security and wages combined
might sometimes exceed the break-even point, since individuals can
earn up to $1,680 per year without loss of Social Security benefits and
the amount of benefits received is based on prior earnings, not on the
difference between current income and the poverty line.B Since social
Security is steady income and Social Security beneficiaries who work
often figure their total income carefully to avoid loss of benefits, So-
cial Security recipients will probably be able to anticipate excessive
withholding and withdraw from the NIT program to avoid it.
If it is difficult to withhold taxes from income, as in the case of
business or farm income, how frequently should NIT beneficiaries file
income estimates? The government could require only an initial
estimate and determine net benefits accordingly. Or the government
might make full NIT benefit payments to those who have opted into
the NIT plan and then require them to file quarterly declarations of
estimated annual income on which they would make payments of 50
per cent in order to insure that the correct amount of net benefits are
received.89
87. See p. 420 infra.
88. See J. PEcn.mAN, H. AARON & M. TAUSSI, SOcL SEcuUm, PRSaEcrnvs For RE.
FoRm 78-118 (1968).
89. For example, if monthly payments were received and an estimate was filed each
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There do not seem to be any advantages in requiring quarterly
declarations of estimated income with a payment rather than initial
declarations on the basis of which future NIT benefits would be re-
duced. First, the quarterly declarations do not eliminate the need for
an initial declaration of status. Therefore, the burden of coming
forward to deal with the bureaucracy must be suffered in any event.
Second, it is not likely that low income beneficiaries will budget so
that they will have funds with which to make the quarterly payment.
Third, poor people are unlikely to be able or be willing to keep
adequate records and cannot be expected to make estimates of income
at quarterly periods that are much more reliable than initial estimates.
Thus, individuals receiving income which cannot be subjected to
withholding, such as farm and business income, should be required to
file initial estimates of income at the same time that they file their
declaration of status.
If the beneficiary discovers during the year that his annual income
is greater than his estimate, he could inform the NIT administration
of the increase. Benefits might either be reduced or stopped com-
pletely. Thus, if the beneficiary initially estimated $1,600 of business
income, he would have been receiving $100 of NIT benefits per
monthY0 If his new estimate is $3,200, total benefits would be $400
and if five months had already expired there would already be an
overpayment; benefits would therefore cease.91
A beneficiary could also lower his estimate; this is the equivalent
of filing for benefits in the middle of the year. The beneficiaries would
then either receive increased monthly NIT payments or, perhaps, a
lump sum payment. For example, an initial estimate of $1,600 would
yield $1,200 of benefits in $100 monthly installments. If a revised
estimate of $1,000 were filed after four months, the beneficiary would
be entitled to receive $1,500 less the $400 already received. No attempt
would be made to identify business income received to date, as in the
case of wage income, 92 since bookkeeping and accounting problems
make that too formidable a job for the poor. Receiving a lump sum
payment is optional since cash flow from a business does not necessarily
quarter stating that income for the year would be $2,000, the income for the quarter
would be $500 and 50 per cent, i.e., $250, would be paid to the Government.
90. One-half of $1,600 is $800 which would reduce the $2,000 minimum allowance to
$1,200 per year, i.e., $100 per month.
91. The repayment would be in accordance with the rules discussed at pp. 422-23
infra.
92. See pp. 418-19 supra, discussing back payments to wage.earners based on prior
income during the year.
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fall into neat periods and the beneficiary might prefer regular monthly
income.
Once a family entered an NIT program, it would continue in it
until it decided to withdraw. Estimates for the prior year would
continue to apply in determining the current year's distributions.
After the year was completed, final declarations of income received
during the prior year would be filed and overwithholding or under-
withholding would be determined. It seems appropriate to require
that the final declaration be filed by April 15, as in the case of the
income tax and Social Security declarations, since this is the date when
filing is "in the air." An estimate of annual income for the current
year, other than income on which withholding is required such as
wages, private charity, public assistance, or social insurance, would
be declared on the final declaration form. This information would be
used to recompute the payment of NIT benefits during the current
year if a change was called for by the estimate.
It would seem administratively undesirable to require beneficiaries
to report past income more frequently than on an annual basis, because
employers would have to compute income just as frequently to provide
employees with this information; it is enough of an added burden to
require employers to compute wages paid up to the time when the
employee leaves his employ, if requested to do so, as suggested in con-
nection with filing for benefits in the middle of the year. Another
objection to reporting income more than once a year is that NIT
auditors would be able to check a smaller percentage of each batch
of returns than if they were to concentrate on a larger percentage of
returns filed annually. Better compliance might be obtained if the
larger percentage sample were chosen.
Prior discussion has assumed that the calendar year is the basis for
determining eligibility. Suppose, however, that a household with $5,000
annual income receives no income in one month. Should the family
be entitled to receive and keep one-twelfth of the $2,000 minimum
allowance in that month or should the calendar year be the basis for
determining eligibility for NIT benefits? It is unlikely that the em-
ployee would have accurate information about his monthly income.
And employers would bear a considerable additional burden if they
were required to record information about monthly wages. It is
true that the Social Security Act requires reports of monthly income on
the annual return. But the Social Security Act requires the employee
to specify only whether the $140 per month exemption level is ex-
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ceeded.9 3 Under an NIT, precise information about the beneficiaries'
monthly earnings would be required in order to accurately compute
the benefits payable. And since an NIT would cover more beneficiaries
than Social Security, the number of cases where employers and bene-
ficiaries would be asked to supply monthly income information would
far exceed those required to do so under the Social Security Act.
Thus it appears that accurate information about monthly income
would be very difficult to obtain; eligibility should be based on annual
income.94
B. Comparison with the Model NIT
The Model NIT proposes that a family receive semimonthly pay-
ments unless it prefers to wait until the end of the year and receive
benefits based on the prior year's income. 9 The semimonthly pay-
ments, however, are reduced ratably by 50 per cent of a quarterly
estimate of annual income. The estimate has two components. First,
an extrapolation based on income for the prior quarter or for those
quarters of the year in question preceding the date of the estimate.
Second, a statement in which it is estimated whether income for the
year will vary by ten per cent from this extrapolation based on past
income; in that case, the administrator shall vary the benefits due the
beneficiaries for the current quarter accordingly. This approach re-
quires poor people to file returns for periods for which employers are
not normally supplying information and to make quarterly estimates
of future income. Both these problems suggest that it would be better
to require withholding in the case of wages and annual estimates for
income on which withholding is impractical.
The comments to the Model NIT suggest that withholding for
NIT purposes introduces a second withholding system which is burden-
95. Forms SSA-l (line 12(c)) and SSA-777 (line l(b)).
94. Since annual eligibility periods could be considered the equivalent of monthly
periods averaged over the year, why not average over periods longer than a year? The
substantive question is to decide over what period to determine whether poverty exists
and, therefore, welfare benefits are appropriate. Should a family with income above
poverty levels in one year whose income declines or whose annual income is below
poverty levels but increases in the next year receive NIT benefits? No attempt Is made
to resolve this question here. The administrative considerations favor an annual eligibility
period since it coincides with the reporting period. Averaging over more than one year
would require maintaining information from several reporting periods and adding to-
gether income of more than one period. Tobin, Pechman & Mieszokowski 20, suggest
that the rich man whose income fluctuates would be denied NIT benefits in most cases
by the tax on wealth, see note 45 supra, and by a further proviso that the privilege of
averaging income be denied for income tax purposes if NIT benefits were received in
prior years. IRC §§ 1301-04.
95. MODEL NIT 303-06 (§ 8).
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some to the government and to employers. However, the burden on
employers is kept to a minimum. The NIT withholding tables are
integrated with the regular withholding tables. It is true that two
sets of withholding tables are necessary, one for NIT beneficiaries and
one for other employees. But that does not seem too burdensome. The
fact that the government pays out large sums with one hand while
taking back much of the money on the other must be balanced against
the burden on beneficiaries and the government of quarterly returns.
There is one problem in constructing withholding tables which has
not been mentioned. We are accustomed under the regular income
tax to equal exemptions regardless of the make-up of the family.
Under the NIT, there is a variation in benefits for each additional
member of the household depending upon whether the member is an
adult or child. For example, if benefits are $800 per adult and $600
per child, four member households will not always receive equal
benefits. The problem can be solved mathematically. An adult is
worth "4' and a child "3." The withholding tables for NIT bene-
ficiaries would be constructed for all possible combinations. For ex-
ample, "4' (1 adult), "7" (1 adult, 1 child), "8" (2 adults), etc. This is
obviously cumbersome and is an added argument favoring equal
benefits for each member of the unit. 0
C. Repayment of Excess Benefits
An overpayment can occur in several ways. First, the tax on a work-
ing wife or child might not have been withheld at a 50 per cent rate .
T
Second, a beneficiary might receive a large amount of income in one
pay period subject to the 50 per cent rate and no income in another
period.98 Third, income estimates might be too low.30 Fourth, the
employer might fail to withhold at the 50 per cent rate because he
was not told that the employee was an NIT beneficiary and because
the NIT administration failed to notify the employer.100 Fifth, the
beneficiary might have claimed too many exemptions.
Should beneficiaries be required to reimburse the government for
the overpayments received? The Social Security Administration for-
gives repayment if an individual is poor at the time when an overpay-
96. See pp. 408-09 supra.
97. See p. 417 supra.
98. See pp. 415-16 supra.
99. See p. 420 supra.
100. See pp. 412-13 supra.
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ment is determined.1 1 A similar rule should apply in the case of NIT
benefits. 10 2 Of course, this means that a withholding system which
allows a beneficiary to get more than he is ultimately entitled to re-
ceive will sometimes result in the permanent retention of excess bene-
fits. Perhaps repayment should also be postponed, or even forgiven,
if the individual's income is just above the poverty line, since the re-
payment appears as an increase in marginal rates and might discourage
work. Only individuals who suddenly become well-off should be
required to make lump sum payments. For the others, repayments
could be made in installments if not completely forgiven. 0 3
Having the obligation to reimburse the government for overpay-
ments which vary in this manner gives the NIT administrator con-
siderable discretion. When an overpayment is detected, a judgment
must be made of the expected income and resources of the beneficiary
in the year to come in order to decide whether to require a repayment
or to spread the repayments out over a period of time. But since this
is not a discretion to determine eligibility, the potential for abuses
should not be as worrisome as when eligibility was an issue.
A more difficult question is what to do in the case of a beneficiary
whose income rises above the level at which he is considered able to
make repayments after the overpayment is determined. Many welfare
programs still require repayment.0 4 The administrative problem is
that it is extremely difficult to devise a "tickler" system which will call
attention to those beneficiaries who later acquire resources. Perhaps the
only feasible method of doing this is to program the computers that
handle income tax returns to disclose former NIT beneficiaries who
report income in excess of the figure at which it is considered appro-
priate for him to make repayment of prior overpayments. The in-
creased cost of administering such a repayment program combined with
a more generous view of welfare than is implicit in many state pro-
grams will probably lead to a forgiveness of any repayment obligation
if the beneficiary is poor when the overpayment is discovered, despite
a later acquisition of resources.
101. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.506 & 404.508 (1968); cf. Soc. Sec. Act, 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1964).
102. The problem of the poor refunding overpayments is related to the substantive
issue of income-averaging when income declines. In both cases it must be decided
whether earlier resources should be used to reduce welfare benefits for a later period
when income is below poverty levels.
103. Repayments by those above the poverty level are similar to the problem of
income-averaging under an NIT when income rises after a period of low income. In both
cases a requirement of repayment might discourage work.
104. See Graham, Public Assistance: The Right to Receive; The Obligation to Repay,
43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 451, 475-96 (1968).
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Whenever the overpayment is caused by the "fault" of the bene-
ficiary, repayment should be required whenever adequate resources are
obtained. This rule is followed by the Social Security Administration.'"
Fault is not always easy to identify, especially in the case of low income
beneficiaries who are not familiar with forms and bureaucracy. Ex-
amples of fault might include the continuous underdeclaration of the
income of a successful business and the claiming of nonexistent mem-
bers of the households.
The Model NIT allows deduction of excess benefits paid during the
year from future benefits up to 0.5 per cent of total annual benefits,100
although recapture of prior overpayments is, apparently, discretionary.
The preceding discussion dealt primarily with criteria for exercising
that discretion. The 0.5 per cent limit on recapture in the Model NIT
focuses on the amount of subsequent NIT benefits. Thus more is
repaid the poorer the beneficiary becomes, whereas recapture should
depend on outside income and wealth of the benficiary in the later
years.
D. Automatic Penalties for Underdeclaration
It does not seem unreasonable to impose an automatic penalty on
overpayments for the use of the money if there has been an under-
declaration of income, even if no repayment is required. And it
seems appropriate to use the six per cent penalty imposed by the
regular income tax for underestimation of income.107 What is a
realistic standard of accuracy to apply to poor people receiving bene-
fits?'08 Certainly no penalty should be imposed if the initial declara-
tion of income for the current year equals the income received in the
prior year.109 If the current income estimate is lower than business in-
come of the prior year, one solution might be to impose a penalty
only if the actual income realized was more than twice the amount
initially declared, except that no penalty would be imposed if the
income actually received does not exceed $2,000. This solution is based
on the assumption that poor people cannot reasonably be expected to
estimate their income any more accurately than 50 per cent of the
105. Soc. Sec. Act, 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1964); 20 C.F.R. Reg. 4, §§ 404.506.07. 404.510-11(1968).
106. MODEL NIT 306 (§ 8(j)).
107. IRC § 6654(a).
108. Under the regular income tax considerable leeway is given to the taxpayer in
estimating his income. IRC § 6654(d).
109. IRC § 6654(d)(1)(B).
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realized amount, and that taxpayers with income of $2,000 or less
from business or farm sources cannot even be kept to this standard.
In cases of extreme hardship, it might be appropriate to allow the
penalty to be paid over a period of time. It is difficult to imagine, how-
ever, that the penalty would be considered excessive. If business in-
come for the first year was $2,000, the estimate for the second year
was $1,500, and actual business income in the second year was $2,500,
the extra $1,000 of income results in an overpayment of $500, 6 per-
cent of which is $30. Furthermore, a penalty would rarely be required
since most of the income of NIT beneficiaries will be in the form of
wages, private charity, public assistance, or social insurance, which
would have suffered withholding and need not be estimated.
E. Computation of Benefits and Completion of Tax Form
Although considerable emphasis is placed on self-assessment and
voluntary compliance under the regular income tax,110 low income
taxpayers can realize these goals only with difficulty. The Internal
Revenue Service recognizes the problems a low income taxpayer faces
in computing his tax by providing simple tax tables for those with
incomes of $5,000 or less"' and by giving him the option of having
the IRS compute the tax and send him a bill, rather than requiring
him to perform the much heralded job of assessing himself."- The IRS
also provides a considerable amount of personal assistance to low
income taxpayers who come to their local offices to enable them to
complete their returns accurately. An NIT will deal with large num-
bers of poor who are even less capable than low income taxpayers in
understanding instructions, making computations, or dealing with
forms.
NIT beneficiaries will need particular assistance from local offices to
answer a number of difficult and confusing questions especially relevant
to an NIT. Beneficiaries will want to know, for example, whether to
participate in or withdraw from the system at the beginning of the
year or during the year,"13 how to determine their income under an
110. Self-assessment means that taxpayers compute the tax which they owe and send
it to the government. IRC § 6151(a). Voluntary compliance refers to the fact that
information is gathered in most cases from the taxpayer's own declaration, rather than
through enforcement techniques such as a summons; most information is obtained from
returns filed by taxpayers pursuant to IRC § 6011(a) rather than pursuant to a sum-
mons under IRC § 7602.
111. IRC § 3.
112. IRC §§ 6014, 6151(b)(1).
113. See p. 417 supra.
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NIT because of the different rules concerning inclusion and exclusion
of items and the aggregation of family income,114 and whether they
should exercise the option to be taxed at 50 per cent rates over the
break-even point until their income reaches the tax break-even point.115
III. Who Will Administer the NIT?
What agency is best suited to administer the NIT or should a new
agency be created? The prime consideration in deciding this question
should be that the NIT is a welfare program, not a revenue measure.
Should this premise exclude the Internal Revenue Service as an
administrator? The IRS labors mightily to appear helpful to taxpayers
and to avoid antagonizing the public. Although it must deal with
sensitive elements of the population as part of its function, it would
not be wise to require the IRS to deal extensively with the poor unless
necessary. The public's image of the IRS would certainly be affected
if it appeared to be badgering poor people. And the poor might be
less reluctant to comply with the regular income tax when they
joined the ranks of regular taxpayers in the future. Still an NIT bene-
ficiary might believe that the IRS would deal more favorably with
them than do the current administrators of welfare laws. The IRS
certainly tends to be less overbearing than welfare administrators. It is
less likely to explore every nook and cranny of a taxpayer's history and
more likely to focus only on significant issues. This is based on the
IRS's intensive effort to attain professional audit standards, an efficient
allocation of limited resources, and a good public image. Professional-
ism, managerial planning, and public relations seem to be coming to
the administration of welfare laws, if at all, very belatedly. But if wel-
fare administrators could adopt the professionalism and modern man-
agement techniques of the IRS and at the same time be understanding
of the problems faced by beneficiaries, it would be better if welfare-
oriented administrators enforced the NIT. IRS agents, despite attempts
at understanding, are trained to look for omissions by individuals, and
for failures to comply, rather than for excuses for noncompliance. The
IRS should, however, handle mechanical functions not involving tax-
payer contact or investigation. Declarations of status and income should
be filed with the IRS by the beneficiaries and their employers, and
114. See pp. 389-403 supra.
115. See pp. 413-14 supra.
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benefit computations should be handled by computers at the IRS com-
puting center, if this would be economical.
Is there an agency, then, which distributes benefits but which does
not have the shortcomings of the IRS or of the current administrators
of public assistance?
The Social Security Administration can probably satisfy these re-
quirements. 116 It must deal with the poor,"1T and its staff is accustomed
to assisting aged individuals who often are unable to deal with forms,
numbers, and bureaucracies. The Social Security Administration must
also decide whether and in what manner overpayments should be
repaid and determine whether the beneficiary is at fault in causing
the overpayment."18 In order to perform these functions, its offices are
much more decentralized than IRS district offices; many are located in
urban ghetto areas.10 Under current practice, claims representatives
in the Social Security district offices both assist applicants and deter-
mine whether the beneficiary is able to repay an overpayment. This
arrangement seems useful; those deciding whether overpayments should
be returned should also have experience in assisting individual bene-
ficiaries.
The Social Security Administration, however, does lack significant
and detailed experience in auditing and investigating income records. 2 '
Under current practice, claims representatives rarely initiate investiga-
tions of a beneficiary's income of their own volition. Generally an
investigation occurs only when an initial declaration is filed.12 1 And
annual returns of income are generally audited only upon the request
of a regional payment center and then only when initial estimates and
116. Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers-And Poor People
Too, 39 Miss. L.J. 371, 391-405 (1968), notes the Social Security Administration's record
of excellence in dealing with beneficiaries, but still finds it somewhat middle-class
oriented.
117. In 1961, 62.9 per cent of Social Security benefits were received by those who were
poor before receiving their Social Security; C. GaREN, supra note 5, at 20.
118. Soc. Sec. Act, 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1964).
119. 33 Fed. Reg. 5837-43 (1968).
120. It is true that wages and business and farm income will reduce benefits If tile
exceed $1,680 per year and $140 in any one month. Soc. Sec. Act, 42 U.S.C. § 404(b)
(1964). The NIT tax base, however, will include many other kinds of income and there
will probably be no exemption. The NIT will also require determining the income of
the entire family and membership in the household. At present, income of other mem-
bers of the family besides the beneficiary are irrelevant for Social Security purposes and
marriage is the criterion for determining whether benefits cease, without regard to the
existence of a household. Children's benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B) (1964), and widow's
benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1)(A) (1964), cease on remarriage.
121. For example, if a businessman files for benefits claiming that his wife now owns
the business, an investigation to see if he has really divested himself of the income Is
often warranted. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Ribicoff, 207 F. Supp. 511 (D. Kan. 1962).
428
Vol. 78: 388, 1969
Administration of a Negative Income Tax
final declarations by the beneficiary do not match or the beneficiary's
and the employer's returns do not match. Little effort seems directed
at developing audit criteria for checking income or checking samples of
beneficiaries to determine if income is accurately reported. Most audit
programs involve verifying events which determine eligibility, such
as a disability, 22 rather than income of the beneficiary. This auditing
and investigating deficiency would have to be eliminated before the
Social Security Administrator could effectively administer an NIT.
A difficult administrative problem would be coordinating the audit-
ing activities of the Social Security Administration with the IRS when
an individual appears to be on the borderline of the NIT and regular
income tax or an individual has filed for NIT benefits but his in-
come exceeds the break-even point. The best approach would require
the Social Security Administration to audit the records of any indi-
viduals who have filed for NIT benefits. If the Social Security Ad-
ministration decides that the case might involve payment of the
regular tax and would probably involve complex auditing problems,
the Internal Revenue Service would be notified and would enter the
case if it considered it appropriate. The IRS has an interest in insuring
that the Social Security Administration exercises its discretion to
notify the IRS in a satisfactory manner. This interest can be protected
by permitting the IRS to select and review a sample of NIT returns
to determine if the procedures and the criteria for notifying the IRS
are adequate. Presumably the IRS would welcome being relieved of
the burden of dealing with small income taxpayers whom it pursues
more out of a duty to enforce the income tax laws equitably than a
conviction that it is producing revenue.
The Model NIT suggests that a new agency in the Treasury ad-
minister the NIT.m It seems preferable, however, to build on an
existing administrative base if the right one can be found.
There is also a suggestion in the Comment that the NIT and current
proposals to reform public assistance are "not so much alternative
ways of dealing with poverty as they are alternative ways of dealing
with Congress." The suggestion is that reformed welfare programs
will be "strikingly similar" to an NIT.
There are several steps which could be taken to make welfare ap-
proach an NIT. It is possible to require public assistance programs to
122. Apparently, most litigation which emerges from the Social Security Administra-
tion concerns disability. See Viles, supra note 116, at 390.91.
123. MoDEL NIT 335-36 (§ 20).
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use declarations of resources which would be subject to audit on a
sample basis and on the basis of rational audit criteria.12 4 Congress
could also move towards broadening categories by making compulsory
the eligibility of households with a father, or, more broadly, by
eliminating all categories. And adequate minimums could be effectively
mandated by sufficient federal funding and by requiring state participa-
tion up to the minimum level of required benefits in order for states
to receive any federal funds; political pressure to join the program
would then be difficult to resist.
25
However, even if a public assistance program with all the reforms
noted above were adpoted, a major difference from an NIT would be
that state administrators would remain in control. A nagging suspicion
persists that the atmosphere of mistrust and dependence which has
permeated public assistance programs would continue unless a different
administration were put in charge.
IV. Conclusion
The discussion of the administration of a negative income tax began
with an admonition not to obscure its character as a welfare program
rather than a tax. In conclusion, it may be wise to reverse positions and
urge that, at least in one respect, the NIT be analogized to the regular
income tax.
When the income tax was in its infancy, no objection was more
124. State experimentation with declarations is described in Comment, Eligibility
Determinations in Public Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in
Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1307, 1339-45 (1967); proposed regulations requiring a
declaration system in all states appear in 33 Fed. Reg. 17189 (1968). In their final form,
these regulations require only testing of a "simplified method" of needs anti resources.
They reflect a preoccupation with inaccurate declarations by establishing lack of clarity
as an audit criterion and by authorizing a fraud warning on the form. 34 Fed. Reg.
1144-46 (1969).
125. Congress does not seem disposed towards these reforms. The Report of the
Advisory Council on Public Welfare in June 1966 recommended many changes in public
assistance, among which were the provision of an adequate nation-widc floor on benefits
based on cost of living in each state and the provision of help to all the poor without
regard to categories. See Having the Power, We Have the Duty, 4 WELFARE N REview
(Dec. 1966) at I. An adequate floor was mandated by the Administration's 1967 pro-
posals, H.R. 5710, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. § 202 (1967), but categories were retained. The
bill which emerged from the House Ways and Means Committee dropped requirements
for a floor on benefits. H.R. 12080, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The floor was not returned
to the bill by the Senate. However, the Senate did add a requirement that states must
include in their programs of aid to families with dependent children those families In
need due to unemployment of the father. 189 CONG. REC. 16817-20 (1967). Even this
modest attempt to expand categories was eliminated in conference. The history of the
Social Security Amendmentts of 1967 appears in 6 WELFARE IN REvmw (May-June 1968)
at 1.
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vigorously put forth than that it would be inquisitorial.'- Professor
Seligman considered that withholding was the only solution for a
democratic society.127 He believed that inquisitorial techniques for
accurately determining the taxpayer's income were suitable for Ger-
many, but not for the United States; besides, the strain on the adminis-
tration caused by trying to make such accurate detenninations would
be too great.128 These objections are probably responsible for the much
publicized emphasis on self-assessment and taxpayer assistance under
the regular income tax and for the speedy adoption of withholding
from wages once it became a mass tax.
While we have not been willing to accept an inquisitional income
tax, we have nevertheless acquiesced in an inquisitorial welfare system.
Preoccupation with the possibility of fraud and overpayments has
overshadowed the importance of providing benefits and services to
welfare beneficiaries. The proposals in this article do not eliminate
problems of overpayment any more than the regular income tax can
eliminate underpayments. But a double standard which treats tax-
payers and welfare beneficiaries differently is no longer tolerable, and
it is in that spirit that the problems of administering a negative income
tax program have been discussed.
126. R- PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UrrED STATES 25, 33, 39 (1954).
127. E. SELMEAN, THE INCOME TAX; A STUDY OF THE HsoRY, TnEoRY, AND PrAc
TicE OF INcOmE TAxATION AT HOME AND AnmoA.n 659-60 (1911).
128. Id.
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